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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Utah Supreme Court jurisdiction over this Petition of Certification arises under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1) (1987). 
STATEMENT QF INTEREST QF AMICUS CURIAE 
The Utah Trial Lawyers Association, Inc. consists of members of the Utah Bar who 
seek to improve the quality of the adversary system in Utah. The UTLA exists as a non-
profit corporation, organized under Utah laws with corporate offices at 645 South 
200 E a s t , S u i t e 103 S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 84111 
The UTLA has particular interest in this case because it concerns the 
interpretation of the Utah Liability Reform Act, which vitally affects persons whom 
UTLA members represent. UTLA members represent and "advance the cause of those 
who are injured in person or property and who must therefore seek redress." (By-
Laws, art. 4 cl.4). If the Court interprets the Utah Liability Reform Act in a way which 
would sustain the balance already created by the Utah legislature, that is, by completely 
safeguarding the immunity already granted under Utah law, fair and adequate 
compensation to these injured persons will continue. 
Through their counsel, all parties have consented to the appearance of this 
amicus. 
STATEMENT QF THE ISSUES 
This petition for certification focuses on the Utah Liability Reform Act of 1986, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37, et. seq. (1992). Specifically, the Utah Trial Lawyers 
Association seeks to have the Court answer whether, when determining fault in a 
liability action, a jury may compromise immunity otherwise granted by law. In other 
words, does an immune entity remain protected throughout trial and therefore must be 
excluded from any apportionment of fault on the special verdict form? 
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This brief will not address the Utah Constitutional issues which may originate 
under Article XVI, § 5. 
Because this case does not come to the Utah Supreme Court by way of appeal, no 
standard of review, per se, applies. Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that the Court may answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the 
United States. Under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(1) (1987), the Court possesses original 
jurisdiction of this case. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1. et. seq. (1989). 
Section 63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which results 
from the exercise of a governmental function, governmentally-owned 
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care facility, and 
from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care 
clinical training program conducted in either public of private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by 
governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from 
suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
Utah Liability Reform Act. Utah Code Ann. SS 78-27-37. et. sea. M9921 
(Addendum 1). 
1. Section 78-27-37. Definitions 
2. Section 78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
3. Section 78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total • damages and 
proportion of fault. 
4. Section 78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault - No 
contribution. 
5. Section 78-27-41. Joinder of defendants. 
2 
6. Section 78-27-42. Release to one defendant does not discharge other 
defendants. 
7. Section 78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, 
contribution. 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act Utah Code Ann, §§ 35-1-1. et, seq, (1988L 
Section 35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, agent 
or employee - Occupational disease excepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of 
this title for injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in 
death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall 
be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or employee of the 
employer and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall be 
in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or 
otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, widow, children, parents, 
dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any 
other person whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death, 
in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by such 
employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his employment, 
and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or against any 
officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any accident, 
injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section,, however, shall 
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the 
industrial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the 
provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended. 
STATEMENT QF THE- CASE 
Cynthia Gines, on her own behalf and as guardian ad litem for her minor 
children, filed this suit in the United States District Court, District of Utah. The causes 
of action seek damages from Defendants for the wrongful death of Randy Gines, Plaintiffs' 
husband and father. Mrs. Gines claims that Defendants negligently designed, 
manufactured and distributed a roof bolting machine which in turn caused Mr. Gines' 
death in an underground coal mine accident. She also bases her suit on strict product 
liability, asserting that Defendants' machine is a defective, unreasonably dangerous 
product. (Order of Certification filed Nov. 8, 1991 at 3). 
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In response to Mrs. Gines' claims, Defendants deny all liability and contend that 
Mr. Gines' employer, U.S. Fuel Co., bears responsibility for his death. (Order of 
Certification, at 3). Mrs. Gines disputes this claim. Under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act, U.S. Fuel Co. pays Mrs. Gines statutory benefits and in turn, legally 
cannot be charged with fault. (Order of Certification, at 3; Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-
60). 
Defendants concede, therefore, that U.S. Fuel's immunity protects it and they 
cannot add it as a party to the suit. (Order of Certification, at 4). Nonetheless, 
Defendant Ingersoll-Rand filed a Motion in Limine requesting that the jury consider U.S. 
Fuel's conduct and assess it a portion of the fault, if any, on a special verdict form. 
(Order of Certification, at 4.) Mrs. Gines opposed the motion and on May 21, 1991, the 
District Court referred the matter to United States Magistrate Calvin Gould. (Order of 
Certification, at 4.) 
On June 25, 1991 Magistrate Gould issued an order denying Defendant's motion, 
to which Defendant filed an Objection. (Order of Certification, at 4.) After the District 
Court conducted a hearing on the issue, it deferred ruling on the Motion and the 
Objection. (Order of Certification, at 4.) On November 8, 1991, the court filed a 
Petition of Certification with the Utah Supreme Court, requesting that it resolve the 
issue of whether the Utah Liability Reform Act allows the jury to allocate fault to a 
decedent's employer, on a special verdict form, in spite of the Workers' Compensation 
grant of immunity. (Order of Certification, at 1-2). The District Court also asked the 
Utah Supreme Court to consider whether naming a decedent's employer on the special 
verdict form contravenes Utah Const. Art. XVI, § 5. (Order of Certification, at 2). 
The Utah Supreme Court, on December 17, 1991, granted the United States 
District Court, District of Utah's Petition for Certification. 
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Statement of the Facts 
The amicus curiae is primarily concerned with the interpretation of the law in 
this case. Thus, any factual situation which involves an attempt by the negligent third 
party to place an immune entity on the jury's special verdict form in order to apportion 
fault would involve the same legal issues as presented here. Because each of the parties' 
will submit a detailed statement of facts, the amicus curiae respectfully offers a 
statement of facts focusing on the statutes at issue. 
The Utah Liability Reform Act governs the issues of fault in personal injury 
suits. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37, et. seq. (1992). Passed in 1986, the Act did away 
with the principle of contributory negligence which barred a plaintiff from bringing 
suit if he or she contributed to the injury. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1992). The 
law now provides that the plaintiff may recover from a defendant or group of defendants 
whose negligence exceeds that of the plaintiff's. Id. In addition each defendant is liable 
for its proportionate share of the fault and damages. §§ 78-27-38 and 43. Section 39 
gives the jury responsibility for determining the total fault and damages and then 
dividing that amount proportionally between each plaintiff and each defendant. §78-27-
39. When initially proposed, § 39 included wording that would allow the jury, in 
making these determinations, to look beyond the plaintiff and defendant to "each other 
person whose fault contributed to the injury or damages." S.B. No. 64, attached as 
Addendum 2. That language was deliberately deleted from the enacted law. Section 43 
prohibits the court from "affect[ing] or impairing] any common law or statutory 
immunity from liability." §78-27-43. Specifically included in this prohibition is the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. Id-
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Chapter 30, Title 63 constitutes the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-30-1, et. seq. (1989). The Legislature passed the Act in 1965. It defines 
the circumstances under which the government may claim immunity. Section 63-30-3 
safeguards all governmental entities from suit for injury resulting from the exercise of 
governmental function and while involved in other specified activities. The section 
grants this immunity subject to the remaining provisions of the Act. 
The Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Workers* Compensation Act in 1917. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 35-1-1, et. seq. (1988). Section 35-1-60 allows an injured employee 
to collect compensation benefits from his or her employer if the injury can be 
statutorily linked to employment. § 35-1-60. The section further provides that the 
collection of benefits under the Act is the exclusive remedy against the employer; in 
other words, the employer is shielded from all civil liability relating to the injury, Id. 
The Act explicitly retains, however, the injured employee's right to bring suit against 
any negligent third person. Id. Under the Workers' Compensation Act, an employer 
cannot be considered at "fault." 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The central issue in this case, simply put, is can an immune entity be 
apportioned fault and if so who should bear that burden? By requesting that a person 
from whom the plaintiff cannot recover be added to the special verdict form, negligent 
third parties seek to shrug off this liability and place it on the injured individual. Such 
a procedure contravenes the policies and procedures underlying three statutory schemes: 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and the Utah 
Liability Reform Act. 
In passing each of these Acts, the Legislature carefully contemplated the 
competing interests of the injured individual, the immune entity, society, and the 
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negligent third party. In the resulting balance, immunity is preserved. Moreover, 
while the Workers' Compensation Act and the Utah Governmental Immunity Act consider 
the needs of the injured individual, no such attention is given the negligent third party. 
To allocate fault to an immune entity destroys the stability painstakingly created in Utah 
law granting that protection. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the judiciary must give effect to 
the intent of the Legislature. Although other jurisdictions may apply rules different 
from those written into Utah Statutes, Utah courts will respect and comply with the 
plain meaning of Utah statutory language. The language of the Utah Liability Reform Act 
unquestionably shields the immune entity from allocation of fault. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
27-37, et. seq. (1992). Sections 37 and 43 remove immune individuals from the scope 
of the Act both by definition and by explicit edict. Furthermore, § 39 governs how total 
fault is to be determined and allocated; it limits those considered to each person seeking 
recovery and each defendant. Clearly, the total amount of fault cannot include actions 
taken by an immune entity. 
The legislative history of the Utah Liability Reform Act supports this 
interpretation. Drafters of the predecessor Senate Bill deliberately removed language 
that would expand those who could be considered by the jury in determining the total 
fault. Originally the bill provided that "each other person whose fault contributed to the 
injury or damages" would be part of the calculation. Removal of this language evidences 
legislative intent to limit apportionment to plaintiffs and defendants. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the narrow issue of 
whether an immune entity can be placed on the special verdict form, past decisions by 
Utah courts confirm a commitment to immunity explicitly granted under Utah law. 
Similarly, jurisdictions with laws similar to Utah's Liability Reform Act reject 
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attempts to compromise immunity even to the extent of allowing a jury to compare the 
immune person's conduct for the purpose of allocating damages to the defendants. As 
between the immune entity and the negligent third party, their conduct and legal 
liability stands on different ground, supported by different social policies-they cannot 
be compared. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: ALLOWING THE COURT TO CONSIDER AN IMMUNE ENTITY'S 
ROLE WHEN APPORTIONING FAULT UNDERMINES THE POLICIES 
PROTECTED BY UTAH LAW. 
As early as 1917, with the passage of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, and 
more currently in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Utah legislature carved out 
and protected from tort liability certain entities. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 
(1988); Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1989). Recently, the legislature reaffirmed 
these intentional grants of immunity in the Utah Liability Reform Act. Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-27-43 (1992) resolutely states: "Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through 
78-27-42 affects or impairs any common law or statutory immunity from liability, 
including, but not limited to, governmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 
63, and the exclusive remedy provisions of Chapter 1, Title 35 ...." Underpinning each 
entitlement to immunity, lies a delicate balance of competing interests. The legislature 
has struck this balance based upon its assessment of what social policies must be given 
priority. 
A. The Utah Workers' Compensation Act balances in an industrial setting the competing 
policies and interests deemed most important by the Utah legislature. 
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The competing interests in the Utah Workers' Compensation Act arise in the 
context of industrial accidents. Thus those impacted include not only the injured worker 
and the negligent party, but also the employer and the public as a whole. 
When an injury occurs at the work place, the employee's primary interest, for 
example, lies in receiving full compensation for his or her injuries. In contrast, the 
negligent party wants to limit its liability. Although the employer, like the negligent 
third party, strives to limit its liability, its concerns also involve retaining and 
attracting employees so that production can continue efficiently. The public's interests 
partake of both those of the employer (the continued efficient flow of goods) and those of 
the employee (compensating the injured so that they do not become wards of ihe state). 
Worker's Compensation legislation strikes a balance among most of these 
interests with a concession from each of the parties. Professor Arthur Larson, the 
author of the principle treatise on Workers' Compensation defines it as: "[A] 
mechanism for providing cash wage benefits and medical care to victims of work-
connected injuries, and for placing the cost of these injuries ultimately on the 
consumer, through the medium of insurance, whose premiums are passed on in the cost 
of the product." Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation. 37 
Cornell L. Q. 206, 206 (1952). The public then, as consumers, secures both the 
continued flow of goods and the satisfaction of having the injured worker compensated. It 
pays the price for these benefits in the increased cost of products J 
1
 Professor Larson also notes: "The ultimate 'social philosophy,1 then, behind 
nonfault compensation liability is the desirability of providing, in the most efficient, most 
dignified, and most certain form, financial benefits which an enlightened community would feel 
obliged to provide In any case in some less satisfactory form, and of allocating the burden of 
these payments to the most appropriate source [i.e. the consumers of the product]." 1 A. 
Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation. § 2.20 (1990). 
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The employer also pays a cost to see its interest protected by the Workers' 
Compensation formula. In exchange for immunity from tort liability, the employer 
agrees to pay the injured employee statutory benefits. Regardless of whether the 
employer, in any sense, caused the injury, it must pay the benefits and it must be 
considered fault free.? As several scholars have noted, this is an important quid pro quo. 
Professor Lawrence P. Wilkins explains: 
The probability that most employers will eventually be required to 
finance payment of compensation benefits and medical expenses in more 
instances where they are not at fault than where they are at fault might be 
viewed as an adequate quid pro quo for permitting the occasional faulty 
employer to escape accountability. 
Wilkins, The Indiana Comparative Fault Act at First (Lingering) Glance. 17 Indiana Law 
Review 687, 754 (1984).3 
As for the injured employee, he or she receives some "small, but assured, 
remedy,"4 and in turn gives up the right to bring suit against the employer. Upon 
establishing that the injury occurred because of, arising out of, or in the course of 
employment, the worker recovers these benefits automatically. See. Utah Code Ann. §35-
1-60 (1988). By surrendering the right to bring a damage suit against the employer, 
the employee becomes an indispensable part of the quid pro quo policies embodied in 
Workers' Compensation legislation. 
2
 Professor Larson states: "The liability that rests upon the employer [for benefit 
payments] is an absolute liability irrespective of negligence, and this is the only kind of liability 
that can devolve upon him whether he is negligent or not. tt 2A A. Larson, supra note 1 at § 
76.20 (emphasis added). 
3
 See also 2A A. Larson, supra note 1, at § 71.20 ("The employer has made 
substantial concession as the price of his limited liability ...."). 
4
 1 A. Larson, supra note 1, at § 1.10 (1990). 
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Thus, it is these policies which legislatures, including Utah's, deem most 
important: that the employee be compensated, that the employer be given immunity, and 
that the consuming public carry the burden of Workers' Compensation while receiving 
the products of industry. Significantly, in making the choice of how best to accomplish 
these objectives, the legislature gives no recognition to the negligent third party's 
interests. See, e.g.. Sneed v. Belt. 130 Ariz. 229, 235, 635 P.2d 517, 523 (Ariz. App. 
1981) ("The workmen's compensation act was not designed with the intent of protecting 
the third party's interest."); Jones v. Carborundum Co.. 515 F. Supp. 559, 561 ( W.D. 
Penn 1981) ("... this exception to the general tort principle of liability based upon 
negligence is a bargain between employer and employee alone and does not bind third 
parties either for weal or woe.").5 In fact, in no other place does Utah's Workers' 
Compensation Act mention negligent third parties except to safeguard the injured 
employee's right to sue. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988)("When any injury or 
death ... shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other than an 
employer ... the injured employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim 
compensation and ... may also have an action for damages against such third person."). 
& The Utah Governmental Immunity Act balances in a governmental context the 
competing policies and interests deemed most important by the Utah legislature, 
Like the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
also contains a balance of competing interests. Government officials, the public, 
injured individuals, and the negligent third party each can claim some interest in 
accidents arising within a government sponsored context. Frank J. Kelley, Attorney 
5
 See also. 2A Larson, supra, note 1 at § 71.20 (tt[A]s between the employee and the 
stranger, there has been no such give and take, no such compromises struck, as between the 
employee and his own employer .... But the stranger has given up nothing, and hence has a right 
to claim nothing resembling the immunities that exist between employer and employee/). 
1 1 
General of Michigan since 1962, explains that the government and, by derivation, the 
public have an interest in defending lawsuits which may pose a threat to a state's fiscal 
integrity. He adds: 
The State is charged with the responsibility of performing unique 
functions that individual or companies either cannot or should not 
provide. In law enforcement, building and repairing highways, and caring 
for the severely mentally impaired, the State is acting in the public good, 
fulfilling duties that by their nature can be dangerous, and for which 
there should be limited liability. 
Kelley, The Need for State Immunity From Suit. 1983 Det. C.L. Rev. 1321, 1323 
(1984). 
The United States Supreme Court , in Barr v. Matteo. provides another policy 
reason for governmental immunity: 
[Officials of government should be free to exercise their duties 
unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the 
course of those duties-suits which would consume time and energies 
which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the threat 
of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective 
administration of policies of government. 
360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959). 
The other parties in a government setting have interests mirroring those in 
Workers' Compensation contexts. The injured individual, for example, seeks 
compensation for the harm caused to him or her. The public has interests parallel to 
that of the victim (to see that he or she receives some compensation and thereby avoids 
becoming destitute or an object of charity) and of the government (to see that the state 
continues to function efficiently). Finally, the negligent third party's interest 
continues to be that of minimizing its liability. 
Governmental immunity laws balance these interests, giving those with the most 
important societal policies preference. Most states limit the amount of immunity which 
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a government official may claim. Thus, the government worker cannot shield all actions 
behind a cloak of immunity. See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (waiver of immunity 
as to contractual obligations); § 63-30-6 (waiver of immunity as to actions involving 
property); § 63-30-7 (waiver of immunity for injury from negligent operation of 
motor vehicles); etc. In these situations, the injured person reserves the right to bring 
suit. 
For those acts which retain governmental immunity, however, important social 
policies exist. Judge Learned Hand expressed them this way: 
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact 
guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other 
personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape 
liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in 
practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to 
deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to 
know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and 
that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the 
burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen 
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the 
unflinching discharge of their duties. ... As is so often the case, the answer 
must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either 
alternative- In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave 
unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those 
who trv to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation. 
Gregoire v. Biddle. 177 F.2d 579, 581 (1949), quoted in Barr v. Matteo. 360 U.S. 
564, 571-72 (1959)(emphasis added). 
Statutes granting the government immunity do not prohibit the injured person 
from bringing suit against others who have caused the harm. These negligent third 
parties receive no protection of privilege by virtue of the government's immunity. As 
in Workers' Compensation, the balance achieved in no way changes the position of the 
negligent third party. 
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C. Allowing a jury to assess fault to an immune entity damages important balances and 
objectives intentionally created bv Utah's legislature. 
Given the complexity of the interests and policies involved in both the 
Governmental rmmunity and Workers' Compensation Acts, and the deliberateness with 
which the legislature has worked to achieve an appropriate balance, tampering with 
either scheme would seem, at the least, unwise. Allowing the jury in a case against a 
negligent third party to apportion the "fault" of an immune party undermines the 
policies and balances in a number of ways. 
In the most fundamental sense, once an entity is granted immunity it cannot be 
allocated fault since as far as it is concerned, fault has already been decreed nonexistent. 
Thus, although both the immune person and the negligent third party may have 
contributed to the injured individual's harm, the legislature has determined that they 
stand on different ground. The immune entity simply cannot be jointly liable, even for 
the sole purpose of determining a defendant's share of damages,6 to the victim. If the 
victim retains some sort of claim upon the immune entity, for example through 
Workers' Compensation, that claim necessarily must be of an entirely different nature 
than one for damages in tort. See Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff Signal Drilling Co.. 658 
P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Utah 1983) (reaffirming that in compliance with the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act, an "employer's liability to an employee injured in the 
scope and course of employment is not based on tort law."); Phillips v. Union Pac. R. 
Co.. 614 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah 1980) (noting that the employer and negligent party's 
"respective liabilities are grounded upon different social issues sought to be recognized 
6
 Evans v. Schenk Cattle Co.. Inc.. 558 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Ind. App. 1 Dist. 1990) ("The 
reduction of an award based on the employer's conduct amounts to an allocation of fault to the 
employer. This is prohibited by Indiana's Comparative Fault Law because a claimant's employer 
cannot be considered a nonparty. [The law] allows for allocation of fault only to the claimant, 
the defendant, and any person who is a nonparty .") (omitting citations to Indiana law). 
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by the legislature when it adopted legislation dealing with Workmen's Compensation. ... 
The liability of the employer is not tort liability at all....").7 
Protecting the immune entity from a comparison of fault is more than merely 
semantics; it preserves, in a very real and practical sense, the integrity of the 
underlying legislative schemes. In other words, apportioning "fault" to an immune 
entity tears at the seams of jurisprudence which aims at producing the most good for the 
community. If the court allows the jury to assess fault against the employer, the 
resulting impact on the employer, the injured individual, and the Workers' 
Compensation and Governmental Immunity Acts are of the very nature which the 
legislature sought to avoid. 
The employer, for example, could find itself forced to appear in every tort suit 
involving an accident at the work place. In so doing, however, the employer loses some 
of the protection afforded by the quid pro quo in Workers' Compensation. Rather than 
the time-honored grant of immunity, it would be faced with having to defend itself 
against allegations of liability. By failing to assert a defense the employer could 
confront, for example, increased workers' compensation insurance premiums, a 
damaged reputation for safety procedures and environment, disruption between employee-
employer relations, loss of shareholder support, etc. Yet, as the Utah Supreme Court 
once observed, "[ujnder the act, the employer has no defense he can assert, and any tort 
liability or complete freedom therefrom on the part of an employer is not issuable or 
assertable ...." Curtis v. Harmon Electronic. Inc.. 552 P.2d 117, 118 (Utah 
1976)(emphasis added). 
7
 See also. Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against Workers' Compensation 
Employer. 1982 Duke L.J. 483, 488 ("The claim of the employee against the employer is 
solely for statutory benefits; his claim against the third person is for damages. The two are 
different in kind and cannot result in a common liability."). 
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Moreover, although the employer stands defenseless, nonetheless it must pay the 
costs of defense in being represented before the court and jury. It is these additional 
expenses that Workers' Compensation seeks to avoid. Not only does the Act implicitly 
reject the extra burden of court costs, the employers and their insurance carriers do not 
include these expenses in calculating premiums.8 
Concerning the injured individual, including an immune employer on the special 
verdict form requires the employee to bear an unfair portion of the total fault. In 
reaching through the immune barrier created by Workers' Compensation, the jury 
pulls in an amount of fault which cannot be assigned to the employer, because of 
immunity, or to the negligent third party. As a consequence, the injured employee, even 
if innocent of all negligence, must bear the costs of that fault. Thus, for example, if the 
jury awards the injured party $100,000 in damages and determines that the third 
party caused 70% and the employer caused 30% of the fault, the negligent third party 
will pay $70,000 and the innocent victim will be left to bear the rest.9 Nowhere in the 
Workers* Compensation Act, nor in the Utah Liability Reform Act does it contemplate 
that the injured party bear this burden. 10 
8 Jones v. Carborundum Co.. 515 F. Supp. 559, 563 (W.D.Pa. 1981) ("A possible 
policy consideration which may have been contemplated by the legislature in support of the 
provisions adopted [granting employers immunity from suit] ... is the facilitation of cost 
computations by employers and their insurance carriers."). 
9 The employee must unfairly bear the employer's share of jury-assessed fault even if 
he or she contributed to the harm. In the example given in the text, the third party might 
cause 70%, the employer 20%, and the employee 10% of the damage. With a $100,000 
award, the third party would still only pay $70,000 and the employee, having assumed 
responsibility for $10,000, must also bear the $20,000 burden caused by allocating fault to 
the employer. 
10
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court not only has rejected an interpretation that would 
require the injured employee to bear the employer's fault, it has further held that the burden 
must fairly lie upon the negligent third party. Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp.. 502 Pa. 
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In addition to carrying an unfair portion of the total fault, allocating fault to the 
employer reduces the employee's recovery twice. Because Workers1 Compensation 
provides an exclusive remedy, the employee cannot recover any damages the jury might 
apportion to the employer. In addition, from the amount the negligent third party pays 
in compensation, the employee must repay the amount of benefits paid by the 
employer.^ 
Because of the impact on the employer and the injured employee in a situation 
where the jury apportions fault to the employer, perhaps the most serious damage is to 
the Workers' Compensation system itself. As discussed above, Workers' Compensation 
is based upon a quid pro quo formula.12 Yet, when the jury weighs the employer's fault, 
both the employer and the employee lose something from that formula. The resulting 
clash between the nonfault and the comparative fault systems would create pressure for 
101, 109, 465 A.2d 609, 613 (1983) ("The Workers' Compensation Act demonstrates a clear 
legislative intent that in cases where a party other than the employer is responsible in whole or 
in part for an employee's injury, the employee mav recover full compensation for his injury 
from the negligent third party, subject to the employer's right of subrogation ....")(emphasis 
added). 
11 Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988) states in part: "If any recovery is obtained 
against such third person it shall be disbursed as follows: ... (2) The person liable for 
compensation payments shall be reimbursed in full for all payments made less the proportionate 
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1).n 
S£& Hill v. Metropolitan Trucking. Inc.. 659 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ind. 1987). In HNi the 
federal district court discussed a prior version of Indiana comparative fault law and stated: 
Under the original version of Indiana's comparative fault law, a fault-free 
plaintiff suing a third party for injuries suffered in the course of his 
employment would have faced the prospect that the jury would apportion fault 
to the employer. Because the workers' compensation laws provide an 
exclusive remedy, the plaintiff could not recover that share of his damages 
apportioned to his employer. Further, the employer could enforce its lien on 
the share of damages recovered from the third party, further reducing the 
plaintiffs recovery. The 1984 amendments cured this inequity by defining 
"nonparty" and excluding the claimant's employer. 
1& at 433. 
12
 See supra notes 3 and 4 and accompanying text. 
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comprehensive modification of the Workers' Compensation Act. The delicate legislative 
balancing, the attempt to give the employer, employee, and public some measure of fair 
treatment would be lost. Employer incentive and support for the Act would be reduced. 
And, certainly many or tne efficiencies built into Workers' Compensation would be 
missing.t3 
Notwithstanding the multitude of problems caused by allowing the jury to weigh 
the immune entity's fault, the negligent third party might insist that it isn't fair to do 
otherwise. Such an argument ignores the complexity of our legal system and the 
balancing required to achieve the best measure of fairness over time, for all. As 
Professor Larson notes: "A legal system must have some element of consistency and 
predictability, which means that it cannot necessarily be swayed by whatever seems to 
be the fairest result from one moment to the next."14 Fairness to the negligent third 
party by apportioning fault to the employer "ignor[es] the fact that one, the employer, 
has already made concessions and assumed liabilities to the employee ...."15 Moreover, 
since most third party defendants are also employers they therefore benefit generally 
from a decision which refuses to regard employer fault. Finally, fairness viewed in the 
context of both the Workers' Compensation Act and the Liability Reform Act dictates that 
employer immunity be absolutely preserved: 
Unfortunately, if such defendants are permitted to reduce their liability 
by forcing the worker to accept a verdict apportioned to the "fault" of the 
employer, the compensation function of the comparative fault system 
would be undermined. If they are permitted to reduce their liability by 
13 Wilkins, The Indiana Comparative Fault Act at First (Lingering) Glance. 17 Indiana 
Law Review 687, 753 (1984). 
14
 Larson, supra note 7 at 538. 
15 l £ at 539. 
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obtaining reimbursement from the employer in proportion to the 
employer's "fault," the nonfault basis of the workers' compensation 
system would be undermined. Given the worker's injury and the 
employer's contributions to the workers' compensation system, the 
equities favor the worker, the employer, and the third party defendant, in 
that order. If fairness follows equity, the Act has struck the correct 
balance. 
Wilkins, aujaca note 13, at 754 n.301. 
POINT 2: SOUND JUDICIAL POLICY SUPPORTS CLEAR LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT, SUCH AS THAT EMBODIED IN THE LANGUAGE AND HISTORY OF 
THE UTAH LIABILITY REFORM ACT 
In 1989 the Utah Supreme Court observed: 
This Court seeks to construe laws so as to carry out the legislative 
intent while avoiding constitutional conflicts. However, in seeking a 
constitutional construction, we will not rewrite a statute or ignore its 
plain intent. "A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that 
unambiguous language in the statute itself may not be interpreted so as to 
contradict its plain meaning. 
Provo City Corp. v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989)(citations omitted). See 
alsfl, American Coal Co, v, Sandstrom, 699 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984) ("The Court's 
primary responsibility in construing legislation is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature."). 
The Court, in Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 1983) applied this principle 
of statutory construction in a case where, similar to this one, competing interests and 
fairness16 underlay the conflict. There, the trial court had awarded damages to the 
plaintiff for injury to crops and irrigation pipe caused by the trespass of defendant's 
cattle. The defendant appealed, claiming that Utah's fencing statute, which provided that 
16
 Even in cases where fairness lies at the core of the decision, the judiciary must give 
effect to the legislative intent evidenced in clear statutory language. Camp v. Office of 
Recovery Services. 779 P.2d 242, 245 (Utah App. 1989) (recognizing that although it may 
work harsh results in some instances, "courts are not free to disregard the plain meaning of 
statutory language ...."). 
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the cattle owner is liable for damages caused by trespassing cattle unless a county 
ordinance states otherwise, was unconstitutional. He further argued, as Defendants have 
here, that other states follow a better approach. In response, the Court insightfully 
explained its role andlhat of the legislature: 
Utah has both open range land and large areas of crop land. Even 
though some other states have reversed the common law rule and require 
livestock to be fenced out of crop land, it is clearly reasonable for the 
legislature to allocate liability as it has by allowing the counties to enact 
fencing ordinances and, in the absence of such an ordinance, by providing 
that the owners of trespassing livestock should be liable. Defendant's 
argument that the plaintiffs should have the duty to fence livestock out 
should be made to the county under § 4-25-7 or, in lieu of that, to the 
Legislature. I t is not the function of this Court to evaluate the wisdom 
or practical necessity of legislative enactments." It is the power and 
responsibility of the Legislature to enact laws to promote the public 
health, safety, morals and general welfare of society, and this Court wji| 
not substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature with respect to 
what best serves the public interest. The adjustment and accommodation 
of conflicting interests, such as are involved in this case, are for the 
Legislature to resolve, irrespective of the rules applied by other states. 
Id. at 956 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
In this case, the language and history of the Utah Liability Reform Act stand as 
clear beacons of legislative intent. The Act's relevant sections provide as follows: 
•78-27-37. Definitions 
As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
•78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar 
recovery by that person. He mav recover from anv defendant or group of 
defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to 
any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of 
fault attributable to that defendant. 
•78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and proportion 
of fault. 
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The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct 
the jury, if any to find separate special verdicts determining the total 
amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault 
attributable to each person seeKing recovery and to each defendant. 
•78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault -No 
contribution. 
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a 
defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage 
or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution 
from any other person. 
•78-27-41. Joinder of defendants. 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the 
litigation, may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or 
contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the 
purpose of having determined their respective proportion of fault. 
•78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, 
contribution. 
Nothing in §§ 79-27-37 through 79-27-42 affects or impairs 
any common law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not 
limited to governmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30. Title 63. 
and the exclusive remedy provision of Chapter 1. Title 35. Nothing in §§ 
78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity 
or contribution arising from statute, contract, or agreement. 
Taken together, the sections create a distinct formula for who may be assessed 
fault, how that fault is to be determined, and how the damages are to be divided. Section 
78-27-37 removes immune entities from the possibility of tort liability; they simply 
cannot be defendants. Section 78-27-43 reinforces their right to immunity. Sections 
78-27-38 through 41 provide the parameter for how fault may be determined and the 
damages divided among the defendants. 
The first part of the formula, § 38, determines whether the plaintiff's 
negligence will allow recovery. It emphasizes that Utah no longer recognizes 
contributory negligence nor joint and several liability. It further states that the each 
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defendant's fault will be determined proportionally, according to how much harm each 
contributed. This calculation-the total fault and the resulting proportion, requires 
reference to § 39. 
In § 39, the Act furnishes a method for determining damages and fault: the jury 
decides total damages, total fault, and then apportions the fault to the plaintiff and each of 
the defendants. The third part of the formula, § 40, abolishes contribution and 
reiterates that the defendants will only be liable for damages equal to that proportion of 
fault which the jury assigns to each. Finally, for defendants concerned that they may be 
assessed more than their share of the fault and damages, § 41 provides for the joinder of 
other defendants. 
Expressed in formula style, the provisions of the Utah Liability Reform Act 
would appear as follows: 
1. Under §38, can the plaintiff recover?: 
rc's fault < any A's or As' fault = n can recover 
2. Under §§ 39 & 41, what is the total fault? 
Total fault = % ris fault + % each A's fault + % each joined A's fault 
3. Under §§ 39, 40, & 41, what is the amount of damages each defendant 
bears? 
each A's damages = total damages x % of that A's fault 
As can be readily seen, the provisions make no room for either joinder or apportionment 
of fault to an immune entity. Indeed, §§ 37 and 43 forbid it. 
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When the plain language of the statute, as in this case, provides a clear indication 
of how the statute is to be construed, the court will give effect to the legislature's intent. 
See, e.g.. Horton v. The Royal Order of the Sun. 175 Utah Adv Rep. 4, 5 (Utah 1991) 
("The general rule of statutory construction is that where the statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain meaning to divine legislative 
intent."); Allison v. American Legion Post No. 134. 763 P.2d 806, 809 
(Utah 1988)(MWe are guided by the rule that a statute should be construed according to 
its plain language."). See also. Smeddon v. Graham. 175 Utah Adv Rep. 13, 15 (Ct App. 
1991). 
Even if the Utah Liability Reform Act failed to provided on its face a clear 
indication of legislative intent to protect immunity entities from an assessment of fault, 
the legislative history also provides further evidence of this purpose. Prior to passing 
the Act as it now reads, the legislature considered an earlier version of §78-27-39, the 
section defining the persons to whom the jury can apportion fault and damages. Senate 
Bill No. 64 became the Utah Liability Reform Act. In an earlier version, the bill 
contained the following language: 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct 
the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total 
amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault 
attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to 
each other person whose fault contributed to the injury or damages-
See Addendum 2 (original emphasis removed, existing emphasis added). Note that with 
the exception of the emphasized language, the wording is identical to current §78-27-
39. Using the deleted portion, the jury could look beyond the plaintiff(s) and 
defendant(s) in calculating the fault and damage formula. The fact that the legislature 
intentionally eliminated this possibility is powerful evidence that no one but plaintiffs 
and defendants can be considered in apportioning fault. 
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POINT 3: COURTS IN THE MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS, INCLUDING 
UTAH, PROTECT THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF THE IMMUNE ENTITY 
AGAINST THOSE OF THE NEGLIGENT DEFENDANT. 
"The great majority of jurisdictions have held that the employer whose 
concurring negligence contributed to the employee's injury cannot be sued or joined by 
the third party as a joint tortfeasor, whether under contribution statutes or at common 
law.M Larson, supra, note 7 at 488 (emphasis added). Utah is* one of those 
jurisdictions. 
It might be argued that the issue in this case is narrower, that of allowing the 
jury to apportion fault to the immune entity without actual joinder. Yet, the principle 
remains the same: preserving the complete immunity intentionally granted under Utah 
law. Although decided before passage of the Utah Liability Reform Act, Curtis v. Harmon 
Electronic. Inc.. 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976) illustrates the Utah Supreme Court's 
commitment to the broad immunity granted under Utah Workers' Compensation. 
In Curtis, an employee was injured while riding as a passenger with a co-worker 
who drove broadside into a freight car. The employee sued, and the Railroad moved to 
join the employer on a theory of contribution. In reversing the trial court's granting of 
joinder, the Court stated that the issue centered on whether the Workers' Compensation 
Act was broad enough to preempt any recovery by anyone, including the defendants. 
Noting that the Act prohibited the employer from being named as a defendant, the court 
held that neither could the employer be named as a joint tort-feasor. It emphatically 
described the Act as a "clear interdiction" against all other civil liability. Curtis, at 
119. The Court added that "no good purpose would be served" in allowing the negligent 
third party to assert a claim of negligence against the employer in light of the 
"magnitude and almost all-encompassing declaration of rights and remedies under the 
[Workers' Compensation] act." Id.. 
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Later, in Phillips v. Union Pac. R. Co.. 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980), the Court 
again addressed the competing interests of the immune employer and the negligent third 
party. As in Curtis, the defendant attempted to join the employer and a co-worker as 
third parties. In rejecting this encroachment on immunity granted under Workers' 
Compensation, the Court stressed: 
The exclusive remedy provision of ... the Utah ... Workmen's 
Compensation Act, along with the cases interpreting those provisions, 
make it clear that an employer's only liability for injuries sustained by 
an employee is the extent of benefits under the Act. Additional exposure 
through the indirect method of a third-party action would be a blatant 
violation of expressed legislative policy, 
614 P.2d at 154 (emphasis added). 
Although Utah has yet to rule on the narrower issue, jurisdictions with 
comparative negligence laws similar to Utah's have ruled that the immunity granted 
under state law remains inviolable throughout the judicial process. Thus it cannot be 
pierced even for the purpose of apportioning fault among the defendants. 
The Indiana Comparative Fault Statute, like Utah's, determines fault on a 
percentage basis in order to fairly distribute liability among the parties. Also 
comparable to Utah law, the Indiana Statute limits which persons may be apportioned 
fault. As discussed above, Utah allows the jury in apportioning damages to consider only 
the fault of the plaintiff(s) and the defendant(s). Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39. In 
comparison, the Indiana statute permits the jury to consider the liability of the 
plaintiff(s), the defendant(s), and any "nonparty." LC. 34-4-33-5. Indiana Code 34-
4-33-2 defines a nonparty as: "A person who is or may be liable to the claimant in 
part or in whole for the damages claimed but who has not been joined in the action as a 
defendant by the claimant. A nonparty shall not include the employer of the claimant." 
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In Handrow v. Cox. 553 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. App. 4 Dist. 1990) the Indiana Court of 
Appeals addressed the issue of whether an immune government entity could be considered 
a nonparty and thereby be assessed a portion of the fault. The plaintiffs, in this case, 
received serious injuries when a truck skidded on an icy overpass and ended up in their 
lane of traffic. Unable to stop, due to road conditions, the plaintiffs collided with the 
truck. The trial court ruled that the State of Indiana, although immune from liability 
under governmental immunity, was a nonparty whose negligence could be considered in 
apportioning damages to the defendant. The plaintiffs appealed, contending that an 
immune entity could not be considered a nonparty. 
In reviewing the history of the Indiana Comparative Statute provisions defining 
nonparty, the Court of Appeals observed: 
[T]he original Act permitted the allocation of fault to an immune party 
even though there could be no recovery from that party. To the extent 
such an immune person contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, those 
injuries were to remain uncompensated. This inequity was remedied by 
the 1984 amendment which defined a nonparty as a person who "is, or 
may be liable to the claimant." Thus, it is clear the legislature intended 
to remove immune parties from the comparative fault scheme. 
Id. at 855 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
The issue in Handrow focused on governmental immunity. Courts interpreting 
Indiana law, however, have reached the same conclusion in employer and other immunity 
cases. See e.g.. Evans v. Schenk Cattle Co.. Inc.. 558 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Ind. App. 1 Dist. 
1990) ("The reduction of an award based on the employer's conduct amounts to an 
allocation of fault to that employer. This is prohibited by Indianan's Comparative Fault 
Law because a claimant's employer cannot be considered a nonparty."); Farmers & 
Merchants State Bank v. Norfolk & Western Ry Co.. 673 F. Supp. 946, 948 (N.D. Ind. 
1987) (Affirming that "a person who is immune from suit cannot be a nonparty under 
Indiana's Comparative Fault Statute because such person cannot be 'a person who is, or 
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may be, liable to the claimant.' Therefore, such person cannot be considered in any fault 
distribution process.")(emphasis in original). Utah's definition of a defendant ("any 
person not immune from suit, who is claimed to be liable") prohibits allocation of fault 
to immune parties in the same way that Indiana's definition of nonparty does. 
Nevada's comparative negligence statute also bears a striking similarity to 
Utah's. Section 41.141(4) states that where "recovery is allowed against more than 
one defendant in such an action ... each defendant is severally liable to the plaintiff only 
for that portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence 
attributable to him.M 
In Warmbrodt V, Blanchard, 100 Nev. 703, 692 P.2d 1282 (1985), the Nevada 
Supreme Court interpreted this section to mean that persons who cannot be held liable 
for the suffered injury also cannot appear on the jury's verdict form. The plaintiffs in 
that case sold their business and for failure to timely liquidate the corporation, suffered 
a double taxation. They brought suit against their accountants and their attorneys, 
alleging negligence and malpractice. Prior to trial the attorneys moved for summary 
judgment and the court granted the motion. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge gave 
the jury an instruction requiring them to compare the negligence of the attorneys, the 
plaintiffs, and the accountants. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing among other things, that 
the attorneys should not have appeared on the verdict form. 
The Nevada Supreme Court addressed this issue of apportionment and held that 
The plain language of the comparative negligence statute required 
apportioning of liability "among the defendants" and then only "[wjhere 
recovery is allowed against more than one defendant" in an action. The 
statutory scheme provided for comparison of the plaintiff's negligence 
with that of the "person or persons against whom recovery is sought," or 
alternatively stated, that "of the defendant or combine negligence of 
multiple defendants." ... No reference was made to the negligence of other 
possible tortfeasors. 
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Warmbrodt. 100 Nev. at 708, 692 P.2d at 1286 (emphasis in original, citations 
omitted). Although other portions of the Nevada Comparative Negligence Statute have 
been modified, this language remains intact. Thus, like the Utah comparative scheme, in 
apportioning damages the jury can compare only the fault of the plaintiff and the 
defendant.17 
CONCLUSION 
By completely safeguarding the immune entity from any allocation of fault, the 
Court will protect the societal principles embodied in immunity laws, will decline to 
cripple the time-honored policies contained in the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, and 
will uphold the legislative intent so clearly expressed in the language and history of the 
Utah Liability Reform Act. 
The conflict in this case focuses on the competing interests of the employer, 
employee and public, against those of the negligent third party. Professor Larson has 
17
 Other jurisdictions with laws more varied than Utah's have nonetheless continued to 
reject attempts to compare the role of immune entities in apportioning damages. See e.g.. 
Downie v. Kent Products. Inc.. 420 Mich. 197, 224, 362 N.W. 2d 605, 618 (1984) (placing the 
employer on the special verdict form in order to reduce defendant's liability to plaintiff 
amounts to error); Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp.. 502 Pa. 101, 106, 465 A.2d 609, 
612 (1983) (Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Act does not reflect an intent to permit 
joinder of an employer as an additional defendant for the purpose of apportioning fault). £f. 
Mills v. Brown. 303 Or. 228, 227, 735 P.2d 603, 606 (1987) ("Nothing in these changes [the 
1975 Amendments] would indicate any intent by the legislature to have the trier of fact 
consider the fault of anyone not a party to the action when making a comparative fault analysis 
under ORS 18.470."). 
Invariably, jurisdictions permitting the jury to allocate fault to immune entities do so 
based on laws very different from those in Utah. The Kansas Comparative Negligence statute, 
for example, allows the defendant to join "any other person whose causal negligence is claimed 
to have contributed ...." K.S.A. § 44-504 (emphasis added). Similarly, Idaho's Comparative 
Negligence Statute, states that the jury can determine the "amount of damages and the 
percentage of negligence attributable to each party ...." I.C. § 6-802 (emphasis' added). 
Moreover, both Kansas and Idaho's Workers' Compensation Acts limit the amount of protection 
afforded the employer. Finally, Oklahoma's Comparative Negligence Statute declares that the 
plaintiff's negligence is to be measured against "the negligence of anv persons, firms or 
corporations ...." 23 O.S. 1981 § 13 (emphasis added). 
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cautioned that the solution to this type of conflict "should be based on what is good for 
compensation law. If products liability law [for example] has got out of hand, the 
necessary corrections should be made within the boundaries of products liability law; 
they should not be made by distorting long-standing compensation principles completely 
out of shape." Larson, Third-Partv Action Over Against Workers' Compensation 
Employer. 1982 Duke L J . 483, 541. Moreover, any "adjustment and accommodation 
of conflicting interest, such as are involved in this case, are for the Legislature to 
resolve, irrespective of the rules applied by other states." Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d 
953, 956 (Utah 1983). 
Because the Legislature has spoken to these conflicts by unequivocally protectfng 
the immunity granted under Utah law, the amicus curiae prays that this Court will find 
that the Utah Liability Reform Act prohibits the trial court from allocating any fault to 
immune entities. 
DATED this J0_ day of April, 1992. 
RaliA L.' De^ kgrnup Q 
President 
Utah Trial Lawyers Association 
Amicus Curiae 
29 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused 4 true and correct copies 
of BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE UTAH TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION to be 
mailed postage paid to those listed below on the /V day of April, 
1992, 
Edward B. Havas 
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING 
2020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs/Appellees 
John P. Ashton 
Thomas J. Erbin 
PRINCE, YEATES, & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 




Utah Liability Reform Act 
Itah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43 (1992) 
78-27-35 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-27-35. Release, settlement, or statement by injured per-
son — Notice of rescission or disavowal. 
Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a statement, if given by mail, is 
given when it is deposited in a mailbox, properly addressed with postage 
prepaid. Notice of cancellation given by the injured person need not take i 
particular form and is sufficient if it indicates by any form of written expres 
sion the intention of the injured person not to be bound by the settlement 
agreement, liability release, or disavowed statement. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Release § 14 
et seq. 
C.J.S. — 76 C.J.S. Release § 38 et seq. 
78-27-36. Right of rescission or disavowal of release, set-
tlement, or statement by injured person in addi-
tion to other provisions. 
The rights provided by this act are intended to be in addition to, and not in 
lieu of, any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise 
existing in the law. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 5. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to § 78-27-32. 
78-27-37. Definitions. 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission 
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a 
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all 
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, 
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and 
misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is 
authorized to act as legal representative. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 1, relating to 
1986, ch. 199, § 1. diminishment of damages and assumption of 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, risk, and reenacts the above section, 
ch. 1989, § 1 repeals former § 78-27-37, as en-
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-38 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
fited in Deats v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 
746 P-2d 1191 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For 
comment, "The Liability Reform Act: An Ap-
proach to Equitable Application," see 13 J. 
Contemp. L. 89 (1987). 
A.L.R. — Liability to one struck by golf ball, 
53 A.L.R.4th 282. 
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that 
person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose 
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to 
that defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 2. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 2 repeals former § 78-27-38, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 2, relating to 
special verdicts, and reenacts the above sec-
tion. 
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act, 
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration 
or modification of product after sale is substan-
tial contributing cause of injury, § 78-15-5. 
Skiers not to make claim against or recover 
from ski area operator for injury resulting from 
any inherent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 





Last clear chance. 
Open and obvious danger. 
Unit method of determining negligence. 
Wrongful death. 
Cited. 
Assumption of risk. 
"Assumption of risk," i.e., risk of a known 
danger voluntarily assumed, may amount to a 
lack of due care constituting negligence; where 
such is the case and the party assuming the 
risk is the plaintiff in an action governed by 
comparative negligence statute, he is charge-
able with contributory negligence and is liable 
to have his recovery reduced or denied in accor-
dance with its provisions. Kigtrup v. Straw-
berry Water Users Ass'n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 
1977), overruled on other grounds, Moore v. 
Burton Lumber & Hdwe. Co., 631 P.2d 865 
(Utah 1981). 
Assumption of risk language is not appropri-
ate to describe the various concepts previously 
dealt with under that terminology but is to be 
treated, in its secondary sense, as contributory 
negligence; when the issue is raised attention 
should be focused on whether a reasonably pru-
dent man in the exercise of due care would 
have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge 
of it, and if so, whether he would have con-
ducted himself in the manner in which the per-
son seeking to recover acted in light of all the 
surrounding circumstances, including the ap-
preciated risk; then, if the unreasonableness of 
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be 
less than that of the person from whom recov-
ery is sought, any damages allowed should be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of neg-
ligence attributable to the person recovering. 
Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Eng'g, 
Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980). 
As used in § 78-27-37, "assumption of risk" 
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a 
known danger. Moore v. Burton Lumber & 
Hdwe. Co., %Z\ P.2d %%$ (Utah V&\). 
Assumption of risk language is not appropri-
ate in an instruction under comparative negli-
gence statutes. Stephens v. Henderson, 741 
P.2d 952 (Utah 1987) (applying statute in ef-
fect prior to 1986). 
The assumption of risk doctrine has been ex-
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pressly abandoned in Utah as a complete bar to 
recovery due to its incompatibility with the 
comparative negligence system Donahue v 
Durfee, 780 P 2d 1275 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
Bailment. 
The comparative negligence statutes do not 
change the rule that the negligence of a bailee 
in handling the bailed property is not imputed 
to the bailor Otto v Leany, 635 P 2d 410 
(Utah 1981) 
Causation. 
Trial court committed prejudicial error in 
submitting to jury question of plaintiffs com-
parative negligence where his act of alleged 
negligence did not in any way contribute to his 
injury, although it may have increased sever-
ity of damages, comparative negligence be-
comes a defense for defendant where plaintiffs 
negligent conduct was a contributing factor in 
causing injury Acculog, Inc v Peterson, 692 
P 2 d 728 (Utah 1984) 
Dramshops. 
The clear intent of the legislature in enact-
ing the Dramshop Act was to compensate inno-
cent third parties by making dramshop owners 
strictly liable without regard to the finding of 
fault, wrongful intent, or negligent conduct on 
their part The doctrine of comparative negli-
gence therefore does not have application to 
dramshop defendants Reeves v Gentile, 813 
P 2 d 111 (Utah 1991) 
The doctrine of comparative negligence has 
application in a dramshop case as between the 
intoxicated person and the injured parties 
Reeves v Gentile, 813 P 2d 111 (Utah 1991) 
Jury instructions. 
If requested, a trial court must inform the 
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning 
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it 
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the 
effect of such an instruction will not be to con-
fuse or mislead the jury Dixon v Stewart, 658 
P 2d 591 (Utah 1982) 
Instruction that "ordinarily, a plaintiff in 
any action has the duty of seeing and avoiding, 
if reasonable, a hazard which is plainly visible, 
and if the plaintiff [unreasonably] failed to do 
so, then the plaintiff is negligent either in fail-
ing to look or in failing to heed what he or she 
Utah Law Review. — Note, A Primer on 
Damages Under the Utah Wrongful Death and 
Survival Statutes, 1974 Utah L Rev 519 
Comment, McGinn v Utah Power & Light 
Co — Jury Blindfolding in Comparative Neg-
ligence Cases, 1975 Utah L Rev 569 
Some Thoughts on the Use of Comparisons 
saw," when read together with all of the othe 
instructions given on negligence, was a correct 
statement of a plaintiffs duty in negligence ac-
tion Deats v Commercial Sec Bank, 746 p 2d 
1191 (Utah Ct App 1987), cert denied 765 
P 2 d 1277 (Utah 1988) 
Last clear chance. 
With the adoption of the Comparative Negli-
gence Act, the doctrine of last clear chance as a 
distinct tort doctrine was extinguished along 
with contributory negligence, however, argu-
ment to the jury as to whether a party may or 
may not have had the last clear chance to avoid 
injury is not precluded, and as bearing on 
which party was guilty of the greater negli-
gence, last clear chance becomes just one of 
many factors to be weighed in the comparison 
Dixon v Stewart, 658 P 2d 591 (Utah 1982) 
Open and obvious danger. 
By establishing a compaiative negligence 
system, the legislature has by necessary impli-
cation abolished the open and obvious danger 
rule as an absolute bar to an injured guest's 
recovery Donahue v Durfee, 780 P 2d 1275 
(Utah Ct App 1989) 
Unit method of determining negligence. 
In a medical malpractice case, the 'Wiscon-
sin" method of determining comparative negli-
gence, whereby each defendant's negligence is 
compared against the plaintiffs, was rejected 
in favor of the "unit" method whereby the neg-
ligence of all the defendants is taken together 
in making the comparison Jensen v Inter-
mountam Health Care, Inc , 679 P 2d 903 
(Utah 1984) 
Wrongful death. 
The 1973 legislation that abolished the com-
mon-law contributory negligence defense and 
made comparative negligence the governing 
tort principle did not overrule pre-1973 case 
law construing the term ' wrongful" in the 
wrongful death statute nor did it free a wrong-
ful death plaintiff from the imputation of any 
negligent conduct of the decedent Kelson v 
Salt Lake County, 784 P 2d 1152 (Utah 1989) 
Cited in Warren v Honda Motor Co , 669 F 
Supp 365 (D Utah 1987), Western Fiberglass, 
Inc v Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P 2d 
34 (Utah Ct App 1990) 
in Products Liability Cases, 1981 Utah L Rev 
3 
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered the 
Twentieth Century in Tort Law9, 1981 Utah L 
Rev 495, 496 
Mulherm v Ingersoll Utah Adopts Compar-
ative Principles in Strict Products Liability 
Cases, 1982 Utah L Rev 461 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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Brigham Young Law Review. — The 
M r g e r of Comparative Fault Principles with 
cJrict Liability in Utah: Mulherin v. Ingersoll-
Znd Co., 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 964, 966. 
Damage Apportionment in Accounting Mal-
ctice Actions: The Role of Comparative 
Fault, 1990 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 949. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For 
comment, "The Liability Reform Act: An Ap-
oroach to Equitable Application," 13 J. 
Contemp. L. 89 (1987). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 57B Am. Jur . 2d Negligence 
§ 1128 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 169 et 
seq. 
A.L.R. — Comparative negligence rule 
where misconduct of three or more persons is 
involved, 8 A.L.R.3d 722. 
Retrospective application of state statute 
substituting rule of comparative negligence for 
that of contributory negligence, 37 A.L.R.3d 
1438. 
Indemnity or contribution between joint tort-
feasors on basis of relative fault, 53 A.L.R.3d 
184. 
Modern development of comparative negli-
gence doctrine having applicability to negli-





If requested, a trial court must inform the 
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning 
Application of comparative negligence doc-
trine, generally, 86 A.L.R.3d 1206. 
Comparative negligence doctrine applied to 
actions based on strict liability in tort, 9 
A.L.R.4th 633. 
Effect of adoption of comparative negligence 
rules on assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence, 16 A.L.R.4th 700. 
Commercial renter's negligence liability for 
customer's personal injuries, 57 A.L.R.4th 
1186. 
Liability to one struck by golf club, 63 
A.L.R.4th 221. 
Liability for injury incurred in operation of 
power golf cart, 66 A.L.R.4th 622. 
Tort liability for window washer's injury or 
death, 69 A.L.R.4th 207. 
Comparative fault: calculation of net recov-
ery by applying percentage of plaintiffs fault 
before or after subtracting amount of settle-
ment by less than all joint tortfeasors, 71 
A.L.R.4th 1108. 
Rescue doctrine: applicability and applica-
tion of comparative negligence principles, 75 
A.L.R.4th 875. 
Key N u m b e r s . — Negligence <£= 97 et seq. 
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it 
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the 
effect of such an instruction will not be to con-
fuse or mislead the jury. Dixon v. Stewart, 658 
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
Cited in Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 
(Utah 1991). 
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and 
proportion of fault. 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, 
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of dam-
ages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each 
person seeking recovery and to each defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 3, relating to 
1986, ch. 199, § 3. contribution among joint tortfeasors, and reen-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, acts the above section, 
ch. 199, § 3 repeals former § 78-27-39, as en-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault 
— No contribution. 
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant 
may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion 
of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed 
to that defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other 
person. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-40, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 4. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 4 repeals former § 78-27-40, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 4, relating to 
settlement by a joint tortfeasor, and reenacts 
the above section. 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability of section. 
Indemnity contract. 
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor. 
Workers' compensation. 
Cited. 
Applicability of section. 
A statute, such as this section, eliminating 
joint and several liability may not be applied to 
injuries occurring prior to its effective date. 
Where the injuries occurred on November 8, 
1984, and the Liability Reform Act was not 
effective until April 28, 1986, the trial court 
was correct in holding that the Liability Re-
form Act did not apply. Stephens v. Henderson, 
741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987). 
Indemnity contract. 
The former comparative negligence provi-
sions did not invalidate an employer's indem-
nity contract with a third party whereby em-
ployer agreed to indemnify the third party 
against claims arising out of injuries to the em-
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah Al-
lows Contribution Against Cotortfeasor De-
spite Immunity from Direct Suit: Bishop v. 
Nielsen, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 429. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Com-
ment, The Liability Reform Act: An Approach 
to Equitable Application, 13 J. Contemp. L. 89 
(1987). 
Cross-References . — Enforcement of con-
tribution and reimbursement, Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 69(h). 
Joint obligations, § 15-4-1 et seq. 
ployer's employees. Shell Oil Co. v. 
Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1983). 
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor. 
Where plaintiff was awarded a judgment in 
action against a defendant to recover the prop-
erty loss sustained as the result of a collision 
between automobiles operated by defendant 
and the minor unemancipated daughter of the 
plaintiff, and where the daughter's negligence 
contributed to the property loss sustained by 
her father, the minor daughter was a joint tort-
feasor and liable to the defendant for contribu-
tion. Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864 (Utah 
1981). 
Workers' compensation. 
Employer cannot be a joint tortfeasor as to 
an injury to his employee covered by the Work-
men's Compensation Act. Curtis v. Harmon 
Elec , Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976); Phillips 
v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980). 
Cited in Warren v. Honda Motor Co., 669 F. 
Supp. 365 (D. Utah 1987). 
A.L.R. — Right of tortfeasor initially caus-
ing injury to recover indemnity or contribution 
from medical at tendant aggravating injury or 
causing new injury in course of treatment, 72 
A.L.R.4th 231. 
Products liability: seller's right to indemnity 
from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th 278. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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78-27-41. Joinder of defendants. 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation, 
may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having 
determined their respective proportions of fault. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-41, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 5, relating to 
1986, ch. 199, § 5. rights of contribution and indemnity, and reen-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, acts the above section, 
ch. 199, § 5 repeals former § 78-27-41, as en-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Products liability: seller's right to 
indemnity from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th 
278. 
78-27-42, Release to one defendant does not discharge 
other defendants. 
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does 
not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-42, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 6, relating to 
1986, ch. 199, § 6. release of joint tortfeasors and a reduction of 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, claim, and reenacts the above section, 
ch. 199, § 6 repeals former § 78-27-42, as en-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Release § 35 against one joint tortfeasor as release of others, 
et seq. 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
C.J.S. — 76 C.J.S. Release § 38 et seq. Release of one negligently treating injury as 
A.L.R. — Tortfeasor's general release of co- affecting liability of one originally responsible 
tortfeasor as affecting former's right of contri- for injury, 64 A.L.R.3d 839. 
bution against cotortfeasor, 34 A.L.R.3d 1374. Validity and effect of agreement with one 
Release of one responsible for injury as af- cotortfeasor setting aside his maximum liabil-
fecting liability of physician or surgeon for ity and providing for reduction or extinguish-
negligent treatment of injury, 39 A.L.R.3d 260. ment thereof relative to recovery against non-
Voluntary payment into court of judgment agreeing cotortfeasor, 65 A.L.R.3d 602. 
78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indem-
nity, contribution. 
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any com-
mon law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limited to, 
governmental immunity as provided in Title 63, Chapter 30, and the exclu-
sive remedy provisions of Title 35, Chapter 1. Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 
through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution 
arising from statute, contract, or agreement. 
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History: C. 1953, 78-27-43, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 7. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 7 repeals former § 78-27-43, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 7, relating to 
release of joint tortfeasors and contribution, 
and reenacts the above section. 
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1986, ch. 
199, § 9 provided: "If any provision of 
§§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43, or the applica-
tion of any provisions of those sections to any 
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the re-
maining provisions of those sections shall be 
given effect without the invalid provision or 
application." 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Right of tortfeasor initially caus-
ing injury to recover indemnity or contribution 
from medical attendant aggravating injury or 
causing new injury in course of treatment, 72 
A.L.R4th 231. 
Products liability: seller's right to indemnity 
from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th 278. 
78-27-44. Personal injury judgments — Interest autho-
rized. 
(1) In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained 
by any person, resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any other person, 
corporation, association, or partnership, whether by negligence or willful in-
tent of that other person, corporation, association, or partnership, and 
whether that injury shall have resulted fatally or otherwise, the plaintiff in 
the complaint may claim interest on the special damages actually incurred 
from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action. 
(2) It is the duty of the court, in entering judgment for plaintiff in that 
action, to add to the amount of special damages actually incurred that are 
assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found by the court, interest on that 
amount calculated at the legal rate, as defined in Section 15-1-1, from the date 
of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action to the date of 
entering the judgment, and to include it in that judgment. 
(3) As used in this section, "special damages actually incurred" does not 
include damages for future medical expenses, loss of future wages, or loss of 
future earning capacity. 
History: L. 1975, ch. 97, § 1; 1991, ch. 123, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, subdivided the 
section; substituted "damages actually in-
curred" for "damages alleged" in Subsection 
(1); substituted "special damages actually in-
curred that are assessed" for "damages as-
sessed" and "the legal rate, as defined in Sec-
tion 15-1-1" for "8 % per annum" in Subsection 
(2); added Subsection (3); and made changes in 
phraseology. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Date for computing interest. 
Special damages. 
Date for computing interest 
Where cause of action occurred in Septem-
ber, 1973, interest at 8% would be computed 
from then notwithstanding this section did not 
become effective until May 13, 1975, since sec-
tion explicitly directs all (future) judgments to 
add interest computed from the time of the act 
giving rise to the cause of action; legislative 
intent is that the date of the act giving rise to 
the action is in all cases the date used for com-
puting the period of interest. Campbell v. 
Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah L979). 
Special damages. 
Special damages on which prejudgment in-
terest is recoverable are limited to those that 
arise in the period between the act giving rise 
to the cause of action and entry of judgment in 
plaintiffs favor. Gleave v. Denver & 
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AN ACT RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL CODE; MODIFYING PROVISIONS RELATINC TO 
COMPARATIVE NECLICENCE; SPECIFYING DUTIES OF JURORS AND JUDGES; 
ABOLISHING JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND RICHTS OF CONTHI3UTION 
AMONG DEPENDANTS; REQUIRINC FAULT OF DSFENDANTS TO BE DETERMINED IN 
ONE TRIAL; AND OLFININC CERTAIN TERMS, 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 195 3 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
78-27-53, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 166, LAWS OF UTAH 1979 
REPEALS AND REENACTS: 
y>y O ' &&j£: 6> ' 
SUBSTITUTE S. B. No. 64 01-31-86 4:54 PM 
1 ^78-27-37, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
2 78-27-38, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OP UTAH 1973 
3 78-27-39, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
4 78-27-40, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
5 78-27-41, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
6 78-27-42, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
7 78-27-43, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973 
8 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
9 Section 1. Section 78-27-37, Jtah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
10 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
ii 78-27-37. As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
12 (1) "Defendant'1 means any person not immune from suit who is claimed 
13 to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
14 (2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, cr 
15 oaission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained 
16 by a person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in 
17 all its degrees, contributory negligence, assu.npt»on of risk, strict 
18 liability, breach of express or implied warranty of s product, products 
19 liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
20 (3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or 
2i rtifliburscment on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for wnom it is 
22 authorized to act as legal representative. 
23 Section 2. Section 78-27-38, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
24 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
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1 78-27-38. The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar 
2 recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant or group of 
3 defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to 
4 any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of 
5 fault attributable to that defendant. 
6 Section 3. Section 78-27-39, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
7 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
8 78-27-39. The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, 
9 direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the 
10 total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault 
11 attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to 
12 each other person whose fault contributed to the injury or damages. 
13 Section 4. Section 78-27-40, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
14 Chapter 209, Laws >f Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
15 78-27-40. Subject tc Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a 
16 defendant may be Liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage 
U or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of 
18 fault attributed to that defendant. Ho defendant is entitled to 
19 contribution from any other person. 
20 Section 5. Section 78-27-41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
21 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
22 78-27-41. A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party 
23 to the litigation, may join as parties any defendants who may have caused 
24 or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for 
25 the purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault. 
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1 Section 6. Section 78-27-42, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
2 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1971, is repealed and reenacted to resdl 
3 78-27-42. A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more 
4 defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless trie release so 
5 provides. 
6 Section 7. Section 78-27-43, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted oy 
7 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
*
 78~?7-43. Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or 
9 impairs any common law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but 
10 not limited to, governmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 63, 
** *"d the exclusive remedy provisions of Chapter I, Title 35. Nothing in 
12 Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to 
13 indemnity or contribution arising from statute, contract, or agreement. 
14 Section 8. Section 78-27-53, Utah Code AnnotateJ 1953, as enacted by 
15 Chapter 166, Laws of Utah 1979, is amended to read: 
16 7C-27-53. Notwithstanding anything m [section] Sections 78-27-37 
17 through 78-27-43 to the contrary, no skier [sharf • may make any claim 
18 against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injury resulting from 
19 any of the inherent rinks of skiing. 
Section 9. If any provision of Sections 78-27-37 through 73-27-43, or 
SUBSTITUTE S. B. No. 64 01-31-86 4:54 PM 
1 Section 10. This act takes effect upon approval by the governor, pr 
2 the day following the constitutional time limit of Article VII, Sec. 8 
3 without the governorfs signature, or l"n the case of a veto, the date of 
4 veto override. 
-5-
THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 
STATE ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE 
ARCHIVES BLDG., STATE CAP1TOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
MICRQFILM CERTIFICATION 
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH & GENERAL COUNCIL 
(TITLE OF AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT) 
Bill Drafcing and Research Records 
(RECORO TITLE) 
These records are microfilmed under the authonty of the Utah State Archives 
Service Act. LAWS OF UTAH, 1985, Chapter 86, Section 11. (Utah Coc 
I, JEFFERY o. JOHNSON , do hereby certify I 
(NAME OF OFFICIAL CUSTODIAN) 
Microfi lmed herein are the actual records of the Above named agenc 
(AGENCY) 




Q PRIVATE DATA Q CCNF.OENT1 
S3 PUBLIC OATA 
' . ' • + • : 







 ' " ' Pi M 
